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There is a crisis of readership for work in our ﬁeld, as in many other academic disciplines.
One of its causes is a pathological form of the professionalism that we so greatly value.
“Hyperprofessionalism” is a disease whose symptoms include self-referentiality, self-ab-
sorption, and a narrowing of intellectual focus. This essay describes some features and
consequences of hyperprofessionalism in the history of science and offers a modest sug-
gestion for a possible cure.
T
HERE IS A CRISIS OF READERSHIP in the history of science. It is not a crisis
unique to this ﬁeld, though of course there are aspects of it that take speciﬁc forms in
our subject. The crisis is one of pertinence: we are not producing work that many people
outside our ﬁeld want to read and even that colleagues in different parts of our own ﬁeld
want to read. This crisis of pertinence may be something more than a failure of ability—
our individual capacities to write things that get a readership. It may be what many of us
intend, or at least what our institutional apparatus is geared up to produce and in whose
results we acquiesce. That is to say, we have collaborated in shrinking our own readership,
and we have done so just at the point when the history of science has so much to say to
the wider culture and when there is so much evidence of wide cultural interest in science
and its past. The circumstance that has delivered us to our present crisis is, under another
description, one of our greatest achievements: the history of science has become one of
the academic professions. We enjoy the beneﬁts of academic professional standing, so we
must also consider some of its handicaps.
Academic professionalism is a very good thing. To be an academic is to master the
facts, theories, methods, purposes, canons, and conventions of your discipline. If you do
not master these things, your readers may not know how to place your work and you will
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S run the risk of not having an academic audience. Interdisciplinarity is also a good thing,
just on the condition that it means you become accomplished in more than one discipline
and not that you playfully shirk the responsibilities of becoming proﬁcient in any. Disci-
plines restrict and narrow perception, but they also deﬁne problems, procedures, possible
solutions, and an audience for our productions. If you cannot become proﬁcient in disci-
plinary conventions, you may ﬁnd it hard to make yourself intelligible. As Thomas Kuhn
taught us, the effect of disciplinary narrowing is not necessarily conservative. Disciplines
provide the structures against which you can push, if you are so minded, and which allow
their claims and conclusions to be intelligibly criticized.
But disciplinary professionalism can easily tip over into a pathological form, whichmay
be called hyperprofessionalism. One mark of hyperprofessional disciplines is that they are
self-referential. They conﬂate the professional literature with the things-in-the-world to
which that literature purportedly refers; they equate literature citing with learning and the
“building of bridges” between subdisciplinary orientations with genuine creativity. They
fetishize expository conventions and treat them as self-evident virtues. They shun as her-
etics those who stray too far off approved disciplinary terrain. They take disciplinary
intelligibility to be the same as intellectual intelligibility, and, in general, they tend to ﬁnd
the noses right in front of their faces hard to see. As the saying is, hyperprofessional
disciplines don’t get out enough. Attracting interest in the common culture, and meeting
its concerns partway, is seen as vulgar. Hyperprofessionalism is death by puriﬁcation.
Hyperprofessional practices may be academic, but they are not intellectual. They are noth-
ing to be so very proud of.
Just so there is no mistaking my point, I offer two speciﬁc examples ofcurrentAmerican
self-referential academic practices: much of philosophy and much of sociology. These
practices have bounded themselves so effectively, and enforced disciplinary conventions
so forcefully, that they have lost a substantial sense of aboutness. “Doing philosophy,” as
it is currently practiced, is often more about dexterity in manipulating the disciplinary
literature than it is about knowledge, mind, or morals. “Doing sociology,” similarly, is in
large part a display of methodological virtuosity and of knowing familiarity with the
discipline’s currently fashionable “models.” You can tell a self-referential discipline by the
fact that no one reads its products who doesn’t have to. Disciplinary members have to, or
at least they acknowledge a moral responsibility to do so. Beyond those boundaries read-
ership drops off like a cliff face. Professional success is indexed by insularity. And a mark
of a hyperprofessional discipline-in-trouble is that graduate students read the stuff that
their senior professors only pretend to have read. Graduate students have to; senior pro-
fessors have to say they have. Self-referentiality is not an aspect of hyperprofessionalism
that much afﬂicts the history of science, while the neighboring protodiscipline called sci-
ence and technology studies shows only early symptoms of the disease. So self-referen-
tiality is one way in which hyperprofessional practices produce a crisis of readership, but
by no means the only way.
Bad writing deﬁnitely shrinks readership. Bad writing is a problem in the history of
science, as it is in practically every other present-day academic discipline, but I do not
think that historians of science write worse than other academics. The ﬁeld currently has
some exceptional stylists, and many of the problems of academic writing that one ﬁnds in
the history of scienceareso pervasivethatthereislittletosayonthematterthatisparticular
to the discipline. But the problem to which it is worth drawing attention is the particular
species of bad writing that is, so to speak, institutionally intentional. Initiates learn to write240 FOCUS—ISIS, 96 : 2 (2005)
badly as a badge of professionalism; they resist using the vernacular because it doesn’t
sound smart enough; they infer from obscurity to profundity. Some things are indeed hard
to say in ordinary English, but not nearly so many as academics pretend. Physicists write
jargon far more arcane than sociologists’, nor is it obvious that their jargon is always more
excusable than that of sociologists, but the institutional fact of the matter is that they can
get away with it. Physicists, and natural scientists in general, have other things to offer the
powers and the culture than the intelligibility of their products. In the humanitiesandsocial
sciences, unintelligibility is lethal. I once ran a writing seminar for sociology graduate
students. I think they enjoyed it, and maybe they even learned something, but when they
told me that the seminar was of no use in getting published in the “mainstream” journals
of the ﬁeld, I couldn’t disagree. It may be necessary to write badly-in-the-approved-style
to get published in the journals, but it is a guarantee that you won’t be read outside the
journals.
More and more academic monographs and papers are written for the “ﬁles”—as aids
in the construction of a career—and not to be read. The current U.S. News & World Report
survey of graduate schools remarks on “academic monographs well suited for tenure com-
mittees, but ill-suited for bookstores,” and quotes the editorial director of Columbia Uni-
versity Press as saying that “in some ways, we’re producing widgets no one wants.” We
are increasingly successful in not being read: twenty years ago, academic monographs
would sell about a thousand copies; now the ﬁgure is closer to three or four hundred.
Princeton University Press is said to be contemplating a future in which library sales of
monographs will be fewer than two hundred. Subjects explicitly mentioned as “on the
block” in the publishing plans of academic presses include “literary criticism, linguistics,
and the history of science.”1 It just won’t do to blame diminishing sales solely on restric-
tions on university library acquisition budgets and the rising costs of journal subscriptions.
These considerations are indeed important, but there would be no “crisis in academic
publishing” if readers in the next academic discipline, not to mention what used to be
called the “educated common reader,” saw interest in the books we produce. That’s the
sort of thing that academic authors have under their control; they can do little about the
economics of scholarly publishing.
If the history of science does not suffer from more than usually clunky writing, or from
the worst forms of self-referentiality, what are its other entitlements to being called hy-
perprofessional? Here is a concrete example: it concerns an oral presentation, but the
problems arising attach all the more forcefully to written performances. I was recently in
the audience for a talk by a historian of science on—and here I will massage the topic to
protect the guilty—theories of heredity in eighteenth-century Italy. The historian was well
reputed and well established. As is drearily typical these days, there was no attempt at wit,
giving pleasure, or wearing learning lightly, though the delivery satisﬁed currently modest
expectations of liveliness. The scholarship—so far as I could tell—was impressive. The
fundamental problem with the talk, as with much that appears in the pages of our academic
journals, was that the speaker gave me no reason to be interested in the subject. If I cared
1 Justin Ewers, “Publish or Perish,”U.S. News&WorldReport:America’sBestGraduateSchools,2005Edition
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. News & World Report, 2004), p. 65 (quotation). See also Andrew Cooper, “Overcoming
the Crisis in Academic Publishing,” 100-Day Dialogue, Topic 2, 4 Aug. 2000: http://www.honco.net/100day/02/
2000-0804-cooper.html [accessed 20 Aug. 2004]. The ﬁgures are from Monica McCormick of the University of
California Press. The Princeton University Press speculation about library sales is in John Sutherland, “Diary,”





S about, or could be made to care about, eighteenth-century Italian hereditary theories, then
I was all right; if not, so far as the speaker was concerned, tant pis. Self-referentialitywas
not the problem here; it was the self-absorption that is another mark of hyperprofession-
alism. The work I was being told about came neither framed nor motivated. I was not told
why someone who had concerns other than eighteenth-century Italian hereditary thinking
should care about this material. While the performance came “contextualized” in some-
thing like the currently accredited manner, it was not connected to passages of culture that
temporally or thematically neighbored it. I either got to grips with the stuff on thespeaker’s
narrow terms or I sat through the presentation—as we are all trained to do—feigning
polite interest, but in fact thinking about what wine to have with my dinner.
I can assure you that I was not alone: academic colloquia these days are sometimesvery
dishonest occasions. My guess is that at most colloquia more than half of the audience is
not “there”—if they are civilly minded, they are desperately trying to arrange their faces
to simulate rapt attention; if they are not, they are correcting proofs or reading a newspaper
tactically positioned on the ﬂoor. (I’ve even heard of a wireless senior academic who does
his e-mail during colloquia, but I can’t make myself believe that’s really so.) I don’t know
whose response I most respect. For both sorts—the hypocritically polite and the uncon-
scionably rude—the problem is the same: they haven’t been given any substantial in-
ducements to connect what they know and care about with what’s on offer. We do owe
speakers and writers the courtesy of our attention, but some of them make it so hard for
us to connect that a certain wandering of focus is not our fault.
There are many ways of connecting. One is to sacriﬁce a bit of hard-won specialknowl-
edge. That’s not something that many historians arekeen to do: afterall,we’vebeenfunded
to ﬁnd things out that no one else has found out, and we’re going to take the occasion to
put on show just how much we’ve found out. Every scrap of it. The virtuosity of speciali-
zation is causally, if contingently, related to the epidemic of textual gigantism sweeping
the academy. Anyone old enough to have composed a paper or book on a typewriter, still
more using a goose’s quill dipped in ink, will appreciate just how much easier it’s become
to add stuff: another fact, another literature citation, another qualiﬁcation. Everything’s
gotten longer. “Ctrl-C, Ctrl-V” has much to answer for. The strategy of “mine is longer
than yours” seems a pretty good way to win prizes, promotion, and competing job offers
you can take to your dean, but it’s a lousy way of encouraging your work to be read. If
you really want to be read, then try conciseness and economy.
There is much current concern with the lack of “big picture” history of science, but I
am not convinced that this is a plausible way of accounting for the current crisis of read-
ership.2 It is true that many of our research areas have become empirically narrow, and it
is remarkable that no one with any real standing in our ﬁeld has had the interest, the nerve,
or the nous to write a book called The History of Science for more than half a century.3
2 John V. Pickstone, Ways of Knowing: A New History of Science, Technology, and Medicine (Manchester:
Manchester Univ. Press, 2000). The British Society for the History of Science convened a “Big Picture” meeting
in 1991 (see British Journal for the History of Science, 1993, 26[4]), and in 1993 the Fontana History of Science
series was launched with another such conference at the Science Museum in London.
3 I am well aware of a couple of praiseworthy examples that come close, though even here the full obligation
to give an account of the “ﬁeld” is declined: e.g., Richard Olson, Science Deiﬁed and Science Deﬁed: The
Historical Signiﬁcance of Science in Western Culture, 2 vols. (Berkeley: Univ. California Press, 1982). James
E. McClellan III and Harold Dorn’s ﬁne Science and Technology in World History: An Introduction (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1999) is largely structured around the relations between science and technology.
Peter Bowler and Iwan Morus have just published a notable go at Modern Science: A Historical Survey(Chicago:242 FOCUS—ISIS, 96 : 2 (2005)
But there is no reason to equate circumscribed empirical foci with pedantry or the empir-
ically small scale with the interpretatively trivial: the universe may be legible in a grain
of sand, sermons can be read in stones of any size, and well-framed case studiesareamong
the discipline’s ﬁnest products. The problem is not the scale of what we write about but
our interest in writing about our subjects and the connections we make as we write about
them. When Walter Bagehotsaid that“thebaneofphilosophyispomposity,”itwasbecause
“people will not see that small things are the miniatures of greater.”4
Moreover, certain versions of what has traditionally been meant by the “big picture”
deserve to be rejected. Big pictures imply coherence, and, if historians of science still
believe in old versions of scientiﬁc coherence (the conceptual unity and universality of
science, narratives of rational and linear progress, a speciﬁable and efﬁcacious scientiﬁc
method), then most of us do so in a much more qualiﬁed sense than we once did. Others
do not believe in such coherences at all—I am one of them—and therefore ways of
composing a big picture demand not just steeling our nerves but a radical rethinking of
the identity of our subject matter. There is an important sense in which the absence of big-
picture narratives in the history of science should be celebrated as a positive accomplish-
ment.5
What cannot, however, be viewed with complacency is the self-absorption, if not the
self-referentiality, that comes with hyperprofessionalism. We owe our audiences a sense
of “aboutness” that brings them into our conversations rather than excludes them. If tra-
ditional “big pictures” are not the solution to the crisis in readership, nevertheless,acertain
connectedness must be. In my own line of work, a maxim of method—not an epistemo-
logical evaluation—has been to treat science as a typical form of culture. Whatever can
be learned from the detailed, naturalistic study of a particular scientiﬁc practice may be
applied to our overall understandings of knowledge and the conditions of its making.6
Studies of science can therefore engage the interests of anyone concerned with culture,
cognition, language, or social or material practice. A study of eighteenth-century Italian
theories of heredity, framed and motivated that way, may be as pertinent to such concerns
as anything else. Of course, many historians are not that way inclined; nor, despite my
own preferences, is there any necessity that they should be. So I have a modest suggestion
about how we might break the constraints of self-absorption and remake an audience for
the history of science.
Imagine that you are the historian whose special expertise is Italian theories of heredity
in the eighteenth century. Then imagine that you are at a dinner party with a selection of
your friends, each of whom has special knowledge in some other domain (not necessarily
Univ. Chicago Press, 2005) from the Scientiﬁc Revolution to the present. My reference to “half a century” ago
points to Stephen F. Mason, A History of the Sciences (New York: Collier, 1962), originally published as Main
Currents of Scientiﬁc Thought: A History of the Sciences (New York: Schuman, 1953). This book is still in print
and is widely used in teaching the history of science.
4 Walter Bagehot, Physics and Politics; or, Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of “Natural Selec-
tion” and “Inheritance” to Political Society (1872; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Tru ¨bner, 1905), p. 91.
5 See esp. Roger Smith, “The Big Picture: Writing Psychology into the History of the Human Sciences,”
Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 1998, 34:1–13. For positive aspects of rejecting the traditional
big picture of the Scientiﬁc Revolution see, e.g., Roy Porter, “The Scientiﬁc Revolution: A Spoke in the Wheel?”
in Revolution in History, ed. Porter and Mikula ´s ˇ Teich (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 290–
316.
6 As originally urged by Barry Barnes in Scientiﬁc Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1974); and Barnes, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,





S to do with history or with science), and each of whom you regard as at least as intelligent
as yourself. Your friends then ask you what you’re up to (why it’s interesting, what its
point is). You may think I am describing the conventions of High Table at Oxford or
Cambridge, but not quite. While I am making it easier for you by giving you university-
educated imaginary friends, it will be helpful to suppose that some of them are not aca-
demics. The constraints are given by the mode of civility pertaining to the situation: you
cannot answer them by giving them a stack of offprints, by embarking on a ﬁfty-minute
lecture, or by presuming the proprietary knowledge and special sensibilities of your aca-
demic discipline. You owe them an answer that is economical and intelligible and that
speaks to concerns that they may plausibly be assumed already to have. You would never
think of patronizing these friends—remember that they are as blessed with native intel-
ligence as yourself and that they can take on any bit of knowledge and understand any
argument, provided that you make these pertinent and concisely intelligible—but remem-
ber also that, because one of them is an intellectual property lawyer, another a neurologist,
and still another a mechanical engineer, they may not be too sure just when the Enlight-
enment happened, what form it took in Italy, what “epigenesis” means, or what kinds of
circumstances commended theories of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. They
may also not appreciate that the current task of the historian of science is to interpret past
culture as it actually was, rather than to award points to those who best anticipated the
present. The exercise that you have taken on yourself is probably not best described as
“popularization”: these friends are not your students, and the tone you are well advised to
adopt in responding to their questions is not onecommonly foundinexplicitlypopularizing
and pedagogical works. You may struggle in acquitting the imaginary task I have set for
you; and if you do struggle, consider it possible that you lack a fundamentalunderstanding
of your own special subject. But if you succeed, my advice would be to write down what
you have said and consider framing your next academic exercise in exactly the sameterms.
You may not want to do so every time—after all, tenure, promotion, and prizes put bread
on the table—but think about it if you want your work to be widely read. Who knows?
It may start a trend.